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Fiscal competition and tax harmonisation are two of the main current issues in the enlarged 
European Union. Achieving these goals and thus improving the EU economic governance is 
partially dependent by the way we understand and practice the so-called fiscal federalism and 
fiscal decentralization at the national and European level. Our paper aims to emphasize the 
similitude and differences between fiscal federalism and fiscal decentralization and revealing the 
way in which the functioning of the European Union is affected by them. 
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The Legal Content of Fiscal Federalism and Fiscal Decentralization 
The matter of fiscal federalism is not new, but its complexity and its special implications upon 
the  functionality  of  public  budgetary  systems,  and  implicitly  upon  the  mobilization  and  the 
judicious use of public financial resources, determine its being brought to attention in many 
contemporary works regarding the European integration process. As concept, fiscal federalism is 
often related to fiscal decentralization and sometimes even considered similar to it, although the 
two notions appear as different due to their own formulation. Thus, decentralization would mean, 
as its name itself suggests, the fact that power naturally belongs to the centre, which decides to 
transfer it to the lower levels, for reasons related to a better management of local interests or at 
least more adequate to the preferences of the members of the local community. On the other 
hand, fiscal federalism would imply the pre-existence of competence sharing in what concerns 
the mobilization of public revenue, (fiscal) decentralization not being necessary any longer, at 
least at first sight. In other words, the federal system of power structuring is intrinsically based on 
a  larger decentralization than the unitary  state  system  of  organization.  Such a  view  is  false, 
because  practice  shows  that  there  are  very  decentralized  unitary  states  (e.g.  Denmark,  The 
Netherlands), as well as very centralized federal states (Austria). Because decentralization (fiscal, 
implicitly) is inherently possible and present, just as centralization, in any state community, the 
problem that arises is to differentiate it from federalism (implicitly fiscal). In what concerns us, 
we believe that the main  differentiating element of the two notions is the legal and not the 
economic content. Thus, the federal organization of certain states is, as the case may be, either 
the product of the tradition of state organization or the result of applying certain requirements for 
making  the  management  of  public  sector  problems  more  efficient.  Federalism,  as  a 
(constitutional) state organization method, supposes an allocation in essence of (public) political 
power by delimiting it on several levels, ensuring its constitutional and decisional sanction for 
each  of  the  entities  forming  the  state,  by  means  of  their  own  Constitution  and  their  own 
decisional bodies, even in what concerns the ability to legislate (at the level of each federal state). 
One may notice, in these conditions, that, within the federal type of state organization, it becomes 
essential the fact that the constitutive states are independent, as the decision-making autonomy of 
the main government levels (federal and federated) is sanctioned by means of the fundamental 
document, simultaneously and differently allotted both at the central level and at the level of the 
constitutive states of the federation and protected from any possible decision-making conflicts by 624 
 
means of the bicameral structure of the Parliaments. Actually, while federalism is a constitutional 
way of organizing public power, which affects both the legislative power and the executive and 
judicial ones, decentralization is a (main) way of exercising power, which only applies to the 
executive power. 
 
The Economic Content of Fiscal Federalism and Fiscal Decentralization 
However, in what concerns the economic approach, what is essential for the federal organization 
of public power (the presence of a separate Constitution at the level of each federated state) loses 
its  significance,  the  important  thing  being  the  fact  that  each  government  level  has  its  own 
competence  in  managing  and  providing  public  services,  which  is  essentially  something  in 
common  with  decentralization,  as  a  principle  of  exercising  the  executive  power.  In  these 
conditions, fiscal federalism is defined as a set of principles which stand at the basis of delimiting 
revenue sources and budget expenditures between the central level and the inferior government 
levels, sometimes even without taking into account the type of state organization. This set of 
principles, which may be  applied to the relationships between the components of the public 
budget system on the revenue side, whatever the form of organization of public power from the 
point of view of state structure, leads to the practical implementation of what we call “fiscal 
decentralization”, manifesting, in practice, in the form of a general (normative) framework that 
this requirement takes. It is this framework, through its concrete implementation in the European 
states, which individually start to promote it because of the necessity to satisfy certain “national” 
internal requirements, that may determine, in the context of the European integration process, a 
series  of  undesirable  dysfunctions  (distorted  competition,  fiscal  evasion,  limited  fiscal 
harmonization,  etc.).  These  potential  negative  effects  are  first  a  result  of  the  fact  that  the 
principles under discussion are applicable or applied differently in each state, with differences 
noted especially between the unitary and the federal states, as they are not able to represent a 
“universal  recipe”.  Although  “universalization”  of  the  set  of  principles  considered  to  be  the 
content of fiscal federalism (in the sense of them being universally recognized) may be found in 
the  related  literature  and  in  practice,  each  of  these  principles  involves  a  certain  degree  of 
relativity, in the sense that it has to be connected to the requirements and the actual reality in each 
state. Moreover, one and the same principle may be interpreted and applied more or less nuanced, 
thus  leading  to  a  particular  way  of  promoting  fiscal  decentralization.  For  example,  the 
subsidiarity principle applied to the mobilization of budget revenues or the principle of assuring a 
certain level of local autonomy involve judgements that are subjective in their nature, regarding 
the extent and the beneficial effects of allowing competences to the local government level, thus 
leading to different manners of applying subsidiarity and to different interpretations of the degree 
of local autonomy. On the other hand, the theoretical foundations of fiscal federalism and its 
applicability are still submitted to observations and reconsiderations, sometimes even by those 
who  put  them  forward  (Richard  Musgrave,  Charles  M.  Tiebout,  W.E.  Oates),  “a  second 
generation” of fiscal federalism being invoked.  
 
Fiscal Federalism at National and European Level 
Beyond the conceptual differences that we presented, the economic content of the two notions is 
relatively close, referring to delineating the competences of central and local authorities related to 
their “rights” regarding the mobilization of public revenues and their use, and, according to some, 
“the  big  challenge  is  to  ensure  a  transparent  financing  system  for  sub-national 
administrations”
406. We notice that, according to such a view, what is considered to be essential 
to  fiscal  federalism  is  the  relationship  between  public  authorities  on  different  levels,  which 
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consists in financially involving the one at the superior level in order to support, if necessary, the 
authorities at the inferior levels. From this point of view, an analogy may be made between 
“internal” and “international” fiscal federalism, the latter concerning the relationship between 
national and supranational authorities or international organizations (in international finances). 
Judged by appearances, such a manner of practising financial relations would not be related to 
fiscal federalism, because the latter has a legal (constitutional) basis which lends it a regular and 
compulsory character, while the involvement of the international organizations has an optional, 
incidental character, involving both the request from the national authorities and the acceptance 
of the international organization. However, we notice that phenomena such as global warming or 
world security, which concern all nations, not only some of them, objectively determine a joint, 
even unitary, approach to solving such needs, by means of common supranational institutions or 
organizations.  This  phenomenon,  related  to  such  mutations  as  globalization  or  the  European 
integration,  gives  rise  to  the  need  to  establish  separate  revenue  sources  for  supranational 
authorities, able to ensure the resolution of the problems in their competence, which sets the basis 
for building a system typical for “fiscal federalism”. In the specific context of the European 
Union organization and functioning, some claim that the establishment of a European tax system 
is just a matter of time
407. A convincing example in this respect is considered to be the action 
mechanism specific to the European Union, in which the common institutions manage problems 
for the benefit of all Member-States, thus taking over financial resources to its own budget from 
the resources of the states involved, in the context in which many of the tax-related decisions are 
harmonized by means of normative documents issued at this level. Although the prevailing view 
is  that  total  relinquishment  of  fiscal  authority  is  not  something  that  can  be  taken  into 
consideration, the decisions regarding taxation (especially indirect) are at least partially in the 
competence  of  the  Union,  which  is  exactly  what  forms  the  core  of  fiscal  federalism.  The 
existence of a system in which the competences regarding the management of certain problems 
are attributed to national and European-level authorities on a differentiated or complementary 
basis, combined with the presence of a taxation and intergovernmental grant framework can only 
be qualified as fiscal federalism. However, in the related literature there are also some studies 
that dispute the presence and the applicability of fiscal federalism in the European Union, either 
in  the larger  context  of multilevel  governance finances
408,  or considering  that it  exceeds  the 
conventional  framework  of  fiscal  federalism  by  being  exceedingly  decentralized
409.  The 
argument they put forward is that, in attributing the functions to the different government levels 
(in this case, to national and European-level authorities), the reasons specific to fiscal federalism 
(such as macroeconomic stabilization, which central authorities must have in view) are subject to 
a  different  interpretation,  in  the  sense  that  only  the  monetary  policy  may  be  decided  at  the 
supranational level and not the fiscal policy. The argument may be considered valid, but it must 
be approached in a cautious manner. It must be noticed that the authors in question themselves 
mention as a premise for the analysis that fiscal federalism is not a set of universally applicable 
rules, but rather a set of benchmarks to follow (on a differentiated basis, o.n.) in delimiting the 
competences related to the management, taxation and spending of the financial resources thus 
mobilized. As a result, we believe that the analogy between “internal” and “international” fiscal 
federalism subsists, with the note that in the latter case the implementation method is different. 
The different manner of promoting fiscal federalism at the supranational level has an explanation 
which is as simple as it is convincing: as long as the relationships of public power are differently 
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legally sanctioned at the internal level and at the level of international cooperation, the attribution 
of the competences of taxation, spending or management of public matters outlined based on 
these relationships will be, in its turn, different. It is without doubt that the attribution of some 
competences, such as macroeconomic stabilization or the redistribution of revenues meant to 
prevent poverty or to protect those with low income, to the supranational (European) level may 
have weaker effects than the management of these aspects by the national government levels, but 
this  does  not  affect  the  core  of  fiscal  federalism.  Moreover,  the  rules  applicable  to  fiscal 
federalism  promote  subsidiarity,  which  requires  that  a  certain  task  be  attributed  to  the 
government level closest to the place (level) where the problem has arisen, on condition that the 
management of the problem in question cannot be better dealt with at a superior level (in order to 
avoid distortions). In other words, if the distinctiveness of the relations between the European 
Union and its Member-States requires that certain aspects such as those mentioned above be 
managed by the national authorities, we are talking about fiscal federalism. 
In the context of the European integration process, taking into account the characteristics of the 
political and administrative organization of this entity compared with the known composite forms 
of state or with the unitary states, until not long ago, the prevailing view was that, at least from 
the point of view of budgetary revenues (in effect, of taxation), the transfer of the decision-
making  process  in  this  respect  to  the  Union  level  would  be  a  forbidden  and  inadequate 
assignment of “sovereignty”, considering that as long as taxes are the main support (from a 
financial point of view) of the sovereign manifestation of states, no member-nation would be 
willing to give up such rights. However, it can be noted that, if the presence into a functional 
association  in  the  genre  of  the  European  Union  is  desired,  whatever  (legal,  constitutional) 
qualification we may confer to it as a form of organization, it is first necessary that all the parties 
involved take on a relative “loss” from the point of view of decision-making power, because the 
minimum  consensus  necessary  to  any  such  association  in  order  for  it  to  function  in  good 
conditions may not be otherwise gained. In our case, it can be noted that generous objectives such 
as ensuring free circulation, undistorted competition, a high living standard, at similar levels in 
the member countries, are accepted on a large scale, but it is not always admitted that reaching 
them involves a joint action of the Member-States, conceived for reasons of coherence and unity 
of action at the supranational level, of the Union. In other words, just as the Member-States, 
especially the unitary states, ensure their functionality and compatibility between the different 
interest and government levels by means of a minimum degree of centralization (reduced by 
decentralization, local autonomy, subsidiarity), the European Union is able to efficiently reach its 
shared objectives in a similar way. This opinion is also confirmed in practice (at least partially in 
what concerns the Member-States), due to the use of the single currency, and the unity of the 
monetary policy designed and promoted by the European Central Bank
410. 
Taking into account the previously set forth arguments, we believe that the opinion expressed by 
the majority of those interested in the matters related to the working of the European Union in the 
sense that sovereignty cannot be relinquished, especially at the fiscal level, must be reconsidered. 
A first argument is that the decision-making right in certain areas at the European level lacks 
efficiency as long as there aren’t any efficient implementation instruments. An eloquent example 
in this regard may be the evolution of the last years in what concerns the budget deficit, in some 
of the Member-States of the European Union, ironically and almost paradoxically exactly those 
considered as the initiators of the rule regarding the 3% limit on the budget deficit. States such as 
France, Italy or Germany are recording budget deficits that exceed this limit, at the same time 
with a breach of the rule regarding the maximum indebtedness level of 60% of the GDP (in the 
case of Italy, over 100% in 2007), which, according to the rules, would lead to these countries 
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facing financial sanctions. Faced with such a situation, the countries in question proposed as a 
method of resolution, without asking for the rule to be removed, that the causes of the deficit be 
separately analyzed for each state. For example, Germany invoked the use of 4% of the GDP for 
the  necessities  of  reunification,  at  the  same  time  proposing  that  the  contributions  to  the 
Community budget may not be taken into consideration, and President Chirac put forward the 
productive character of certain expenditures which would justify their being taken out of the 
calculation when determining the budget deficit (“the research and development expenditures of 
today … are the riches of tomorrow”). In these conditions, it can be noted that the lack of an 
efficient  instrument  of  constraining  the  actions  of  the  national  authorities  may  give  rise  to 
dysfunctions at the Union level, being necessary to attribute extended competences to this level. 
In the case of direct taxation of income, although we agree with the idea that macroeconomic 
stabilization for 27 countries simultaneously at the Union level would not necessarily be more 
efficient than the separate action, at the national level, we have to remark that, in the present 
conditions, there is a fiscal competition which may lead to distortions in allocating resources. The 
single  rate  implemented  by  some  European  states,  without  any  restriction,  is  generating 
differences that may have negative effects. Although it is not entirely necessary that the European 
Union  implement  the  so-called  „European  taxes”,  as  there  are  problems  mainly  related  to 
recording and evaluating the taxable matter, determining the tax value, levying or keeping track 
of and collecting tax claims, it is obviously necessary to harmonize taxation bases or direct tax 
rates. Two mentions must be made: harmonizing does not automatically mean “standardizing” (in 
the sense of setting the same taxation rate at the level of all the states, but only setting ranges 
between  which  these  rates  may  vary),  and  harmonizing  taxation  rates  without  harmonizing 
taxation  bases  (for  example,  the  unitary  setting  of  the  elements  that  stand  at  the  basis  of 
calculating the taxable profit) would strip the entire action of its efficiency. This statement has its 
origin in ascertaining that economic and budgetary systems are not based, in their functionality, 
solely on related decisions of a subjective, administrative nature, but have at their basis the so-
called system of incorporated stabilizers, which first includes the taxes applied by the Member-
States.  Their  reaction  to  the  economic  context  may  be  a  beneficial  one  as  long  as,  in  their 
position, the reasons they started from took into consideration the future implications on other 
Member-States (taking into account, first, the action of economic operators in the context of free 
circulation). Moreover, we believe that the indispensability of establishing a system such as fiscal 
federalism within the European Union derives from accepted economical reasons, knowing that 
the  fiscal  policy  (in  its  narrow  meaning,  of  tax  policy)  and  the  monetary  policy  must  be 
considered related parts of the general, economic and social policy of a state entity; their positive 
effect can only be ensured as long as the measures devised and promoted for each of the two 
areas are harmonized and lead to (or support) similar results and are not opposed, annihilating 
each  other’s  desired  effects.  In  this  respect,  the  free  practice,  by  the  Member-States,  in  the 
absence  of  a  constraint  which  is  possible  under  a  fiscal  federalism  type  of  organization,  of 
expansionist fiscal policies may lead to inflationist effects, thus harming the effectiveness of 
targeting inflation through the European monetary policy.  
  From another perspective, that of understanding taxes (beside public expenditures) as a 
means of achieving solidarity between the members of the entity in question, we notice that in 
what concerns the European Union, tax is not yet perceived as such an instrument, interstate 
solidarity  being  rather  limited,  still
411.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  most  cases,  redistribution  of 
resources within the European Union is discussed only from the perspective of the expenditures 
supported by the Union budget, without the necessary reference to related resources and the 
implications of their collection based on the product generated in the Member-States, the matter 
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of the resources of the Union budget being the object of separate discussions. The positions 
expressed in this regard are often contradictory: on the one hand, they say that the Union does not 
have any competences related to direct taxation (especially of income); on the other hand, they 
require that financial resources be attributed through the system of supranational transfers. Such 
opinions are also favoured by the fact that, in the context of the absence of disruptive phenomena 
(at least until now, when the financial crisis is settling in more and more), which would require 
that more attention be paid to (macro)economic adjustment and stabilization, the European Union 
as  well  as  the  Member-States  have  channelled  their  attention  primarily  to  the  aspect  of  the 
redistribution of resources (for example, by means of the structural funds, which have economic 
and social cohesion as a purpose). 
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, we think that fiscal federalism cannot be considered in any way a phenomenon 
incompatible with the European organization or an inhibiting factor for it. It must necessarily be 
designed and promoted at this level, without it being understood that it should be applied in its 
conventional  formula,  which  is  not  allowed  by  the  characteristic  itself  of  the  political  and 
administrative  organization  of  the  European  Union.  Centralization  becomes  an  absolutely 
necessary  trend  in the  Union,  but it  must  be  carefully  applied  and  must  not be  in any  way 
interpreted as a possibility or a potential danger of “levelling” the Member-States of the Union, 
by excessively reducing or erasing national differences. The management of asymmetries in the 
economic and social development at the Union level, as well as of the transfer of undesirable 
effects from some states to others in the context of free circulation (especially of workers and 
capitals), requires, in an absolutely rational and necessary manner, that the European Union takes 
on extended competences and that the Member-States recognize to a larger extent the importance 
of interstate solidarity and joint action. 
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